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PRESTON ALLEN, ~suing for himself and other American
Indians similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

v.
PoRTER L. MERRELL, individually and as County Clerk,
Duchesne County, U'tah,
Deferndant.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

Most of defendanf.s argum.ent is 1net by plaintiff's main
brief, and no effort is made herein to respond to all of
defendant's argument. As will be hereinafter demonstrated, the four basic contentions of defendant have been
destroyed by existing decisions to the contrary.
1. Ev·en the cases cited by defenda1nt recognize that
state action in granting or withholding sufferage is subject to t.he restrictions of the Co,nst'itution of the United
States. We can agree with defendant that the question
is whether ·par. 11, .section 20-2-14 is either unreasonable
or in violation of some provision of federal law. The cases
have made it manifestly certain that the states are restricted in granting or withholding sufferage, particularly when
involved is the right to vote for federal officers, such as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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United States Senator and Congressman in the present
case. In one of the most recent voting cases, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944), the Supreme Court of the
United States stated with respect to thi·s question:
"Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit
her electorate as she may deem wise, save only as her
action may be affected by the prohibitions of the
United States Constitution or in conflict with powers
delegated to and exercised by the National Government. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State
from making or enforcing any law which abridges
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States and the Fifteenth Amendment specifically interdicts any denial or abridgement by a State of the
right of citizens to votes on account of color . . . .
(p. 657)

*

*

"It may now be taken as a postulate that the right
to vote in such a primary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the
right to vote in a general election, is a right secured
by the Constitution. United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. at 314; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368; Ex
parte YarbroU{}h, 110 U.S. 651,663 et seq . . . "(p. 661)
There is nothing in any of the cases cited by defendant
which purports to rule out the guarantees of the federal
Constitution. Eva,ns v. Reiser, 78 U. 253, 2 P 2d 615 (1931)
relied on by defendant, does not exclude the operation of
the federal Constitution. It merely upholds a statute making provi~sion for marking of secret ballots. Furthermore,
there is nothing in that rase which approves action of the
legislature in eontracting the class of Yoters established
by the Constitution of Utah, Article IY, Section 2 as
"Every citizen of the l 1 nited States, of the age of twentyone year~" po::-;~rssing the npcessary residence tune in the
State, County and precinct (which plaintiff does), and
with eertain rxeeption~ not applicable to plaintiff. Section
20-2-1+ purports to li1nit the class beyond the standard
establbhed
by the Utah Constitution and is, therefore, not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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only in conflict with the federal Cosntitution but with
that of the State of Utah.

2. T.he equal protection cl.aus,e applies to l'YIAd~ans as
weU .as to other citizens and persons withirn the jurisdiction of the states. The core of defendant's failure to respect rights guaranteed plaintiff by the Constitution of
the United States is its argument that "Indians patently
are neither equally protected by state laws, nor equally responsible under them." This argument fai1s to comprehend the real significance of the equal protection clause.
The cases demonstrate to purposes in that clause: (1) to
assure the colored and other races the enjoyment of civil
rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons
and to give those races the protection of the federal government when those rights are denied by the states (Straxuder
v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 306 (1879)) and (2) to
assure that all persons similarly situated would be treated
alike, and that no special groups or classes would be singled
out for favorable or discriminatory treatment (Maxwell v.
Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919'); Sout,hern Railwaw Co. v.
Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910); ConnoUy v. Uwion Sewer
Pipe Co. 184 U.S. 540 (1902) ). Nor does the fact that
certain Indian citizens have some obligations and privileges under federal law, not shared by all others, eliminate them from the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This necessarily follows from the opinion of Chief Judge
Phillips in Trujillo v. Garley (DCNM. 1948, unreported;
Appendix C to Plaintiff's Brief) that the New Mexico
Constitutional provision excluding from voting "Indians
not taxed" was invalid in face of the Fourteenth Amendment. The same conclusion is also compelled by Bradley
v. Arizona Corp. Commission, 60 Ariz. 508, 141 P 2d 524
(1943), holding that the denial of a motor earrier's certificate of convenience and necessity because the applicant
was an Indian residing on a reservation was contrary to
and prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires equal protection -of the laws to all persons.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3. Concurrent jurisdiction by the United States over·
Indian reservations is not a v,alid basis for d.enial of the
right to vote to Indians residimg the·reon. Defendant relies on an analysis of soldier voting cases and the fact
that military reservations are also embraced in par. 11,
section 20-2-14, but this is no answer. Where the United
States has exclusive jurisdiction and a reservation is,
therefore, not within a state, it may well be that those
residing thereon may not vote. J ohms om v. Morrill, 20
Oal. 2d 446, 126 P.2d 873 (1942). But as stated by the
Supr,eme Court of California in Johnson v. MorriU, supra,
at p. 877:

"Certainly where the Congress has declined exclusive jurisdiction and has expressly preserved to the
citizens their civil rights, we should not labor to find
an inference which would deprive them of the right
of suffrage."
This statement is particularly applicable to defendant's
argument on the Utah enabling act. In the landmark
case of U(fbited States v. McBr.atney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881)
the Supreme Court of the United States studied the Colorado enabling act, which is substantially the same as the
Utah act, and held that the Ute reservation was within
the state of Colorado and not subject to the exclusive
jurisdietion of the federal government. Apparently defendant would re-examine the holding of this highest
tribunal.
See 34 A.L.R. ~d 1193 for a discussion of cases concerning the right of soldiers and other residents of federal
land to vote. The general rule is there stated :
"The right of residents in such an area to vote
depends primarily upon whether the federal government has acquired and exercises e.rdnsive jurisdicf·ion over the area, in which case the right to vote
is lost, or whether the state still retains some elenients of jurisdiction, in which case residents may
under
some circumstances have the right to vote."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In this connection the attention of the court is directed
again to Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456
(1948) holding that Indian reservations in Arizona wer·e
within the jurisdiction of the state and that Indians residing thereon may vote. Also see Acosta v. Sa;n Diego
Co'U!nty, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 272 P. 2d 92 (1954) holding that residents of Indian reservations in California are
entitled to welfare relief as residents of the state.

4. The presumption of constitutionality does not extend to this case. The presumption of which defendant
speaks is merely :
" . . . a presumption of fact of the existence of a
factual conditions supporting the legislation. As such,
it is a rebuttable presumption. . . . It is not a conclusive presumption, or a rule of law which makes
legislative action invulnerable to constitutional as·sault. . . . " Chief Justice Hughes in Borden's Farm
Products Co. v. Baldwiln, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934).
In recent years the Supreme Court of the United States
has emphasized that governmental action affecting certain classes of personal rights fundamental to a democratic order must be subjected to rigid scrutiny. See
United States v. Ca·rolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 (1937); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544
(1942); United States v. C. I. 0., 335 U. S. 106, 140,
(1947). Where basic fundamental personal and civil
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are involved, the so-called presumption plays little part and
doubtful intrusions into the purpose of the amendment
cannot be allowed to stand on the strength of the alleg·ed
presumption. As stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in K orematsu v. United States, 323 U. S.
214, 216 (1944) :
"All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immed~a t.ely suspect.
That is not to say that all such restnchons are unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitutional. It is to say that courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny."
Respectfully submitted,
RoBERT W. BARKER
JoHNS. BoYDEN
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